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The Canon Has a History
Legal Canons, J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. New York:
New York University Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 443. $50.00.

Richard Primus*
Legal Canons, edited by J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, is a
collection of fourteen essays on subjects related to canonicity in law
and legal education. Balkin and Levinson have two principal aims.
One is to expand the category of things that can be canonical: not
just texts, they say, but also arguments, problems, narrative frameworks, and examples invoked in conversation or teaching. In their
view, what makes something canonical is its ability to reproduce
itself in the minds of successive generations.' If generation after
generation of legal academics argues about the countermajoritarian
difficulty, then the countermajoritarian difficulty is a canonical problem, and the argumentative moves that are made from generation to
generation -assuming they are common from one to the next-are
canonical arguments. Balkin and Levinson's second aim is to argue
for a more practical kind of expansion, specifically the expansion of
the canon that defines what is taught to introductory students of
constitutional law. According to the editors, the present pedagogic
canon3 is too focused on a few clauses of the Constitution and on
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Michigan.
1. LEGAL CANONS (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
2. There are points of contact between this view of canonicity and Balkin's other work on
"memes," ie., units of cultural knowledge or practice that are transmitted from one generation
to the next. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 42-90 (1998).
3. I use the term "pedagogic canon" to refer to the canon that structures what students
must be taught in constitutional law courses. As Balkin and Levinson point out, this is only one
of several types of legal canons. There is a "legal authority" canon composed of those texts and
doctrines that bind courts and with which practicing lawyers must therefore be conversant, but
there is also a "cultural literacy" canon composed of things that anyone who wishes to participate in serious discussions about the relevant field must know, as well as an "academic theory"
canon that defines the world in which law professors conduct contemporary scholarship
LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 5. These canons overlap: a case like United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), probably belongs in all three. But the canons also diverge. No lawyer
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opinions of the United States Supreme Court. They urge more attention to the development of American constitutionalism outside the
courtroom. Balkin and Levinson's view of constitutional development is historically oriented and radically democratic: they wish the
canon to include materials that will show how all Americans, not just
judges or even officeholders, have affected the meaning of the Constitution.
Two of the book's essays are jointly written by Balkin and Levinson themselves, and the remaining twelve essays are by other
scholars. The success of the twelve other essays is uneven. A handful,
however, do throw light upon what is most provocative in Balkin and
Levinson's ideas. For example, Carol Rose's essay on the canons of
"property talk" provides excellent illustrations of how patterns of
argument can be canonical, shaping a field of law just as pervasively
as any court decision or other written text.4 Daniel Farber contributes a thoughtful piece arguing that professors who believe law and
economics to be unhelpful nonsense must nonetheless acquaint their
students with the field, because law and economics structures the
thinking of many legal professionals and learning what other legal
professionals take seriously is essential to becoming an educated
lawyer.' (Education is in part the study and critique of canonical
nonsense.) Katherine Franke's essay "Homosexuals, Torts, and
Dangerous Things" provides an interesting sketch of how the recent
emergence of gay and lesbian law as a distinct field with its own
canonical structure in some ways recapitulated and in some ways
diverged from the pattern by which older legal fields like torts came
to assume familiar and eventually canonical shapes.' And Randall
Kennedy offers a crisp, affirmative program for the integration of
race relations topics into the pedagogic canon, engaging and critiquing the way in which Balkin and Levinson propose to incorporate
certain kinds of historical materials.7
One important way to understand Balkin and Levinson's project is
to read their book as a companion to the constitutional law casebook
that they edit.' Certainly Balkin and Levinson conceive of the two
would cite Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in a brief, but nobody who does not know
Lochneris an educated constitutional lawyer.
4. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone IsAnxiety, in LEGAL CANONS,
supra note 1, at 66.
5. Daniel A. Farber, Of Coase and the Canon: Reflections on Law and Economics, in
LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 184.
6. Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, in LEGAL CANONS,
supra note 1, at 303.
7. Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, in LEGAL
CANONS, supra note 1, at 211.
8. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson,
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books as part of the same project. Casebooks are canon-creators,
and the preface to this casebook is a six-page methodological essayunique among casebooks'-laying out the editors' views about their
attempt to construct a canon for constitutional law. Quite self-consciously, they want to emphasize different parts of the Constitution
and different parts of American history from those that have
generally been taught in constitutional law classes. The historical
orientation of the casebook is a central feature, and much of the
book is organized by historical period rather than doctrinal topic.
Moreover, the history they propose to examine is not all sweetness
and light. As they make clear in Legal Canons,Balkin and Levinson
believe more attention should be paid to the role of slavery in
shaping American constitutional development, and their casebook
follows through with sections on the constitutional treatment of the
interstate slave trade, the problem of fugitive slaves, the role of
slavery in the secession crisis, and the role of slavery in nineteenthcentury attitudes toward judicial supremacy. In the same vein, Balkin
and Levinson's central example of a historical text that is not
generally taught but should be is Frederick Douglass's 1860 Glasgow
speech on the Constitution as an anti-slavery document."°
The commitment to teaching constitutional law as a historicallyembedded phenomenon is welcome, as is the desire to expand the
history to which law students are exposed. At the same time, the
ways in which Balkin and Levinson (and their casebook co-editors,
Paul Brest and Akhil Amar) choose to reconstruct the pedagogic
canon raise questions about what kind of fidelity the pedagogic
enterprise owes to the history of its subject and indeed to the history
of constitutional pedagogy itself. Constitutional meaning has been
shaped in part by the kinds of non-judicial material that Balkin and
Levinson wish to add to the canon, but it has also been shaped by the
way that constitutional law has been taught to American lawyers
from decade to decade. Part of the reason why Balkin and Levinson
want to reform the canon is that they want the next generation to use
different intellectual tools when constructing constitutional meaning.
By the same token, the intellectual tools available to previous
generations have helped determine what the Constitution has meant
in the past. Accordingly, a historically oriented curriculum must adJ.M Balkin, & Akhil Reed Amar, eds., 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Brest, Levinson].
9. I have sampled the most recent editions of the nine other constitutional law casebooks
on my office shelf and found that they have nineteen pages of preface combined. None of the
prefaces is even a third as long as that in the most recent edition of Brest, Levinson.
10. Frederick Douglas, The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or AntiSlavery? (1860), repnnted in Brest, Levinson, supra note 8, at 207; Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Canons and Constitutional Thought, in LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 400-02.

HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J.L. & Human. 223 2002

224

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 14: 221

dress not only important historical subjects like slavery but also the
history of the canon itself.
Consider again the example of Douglass's Glasgow speech. In
their casebook, Balkin, Levinson, and company reproduce the
speech as a counterpart to the Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott,1 one document interpreting the Constitution as supporting
slavery and the other interpreting the Constitution as hostile to
slavery. Teaching Douglass's speech alongside DredScott is a terrific
idea in the service of several pedagogic aims, such as asking students
(a) how one chooses among conflicting interpretations of the
Constitution, and perhaps (b) when, if ever, one should intentionally
misread the Constitution. But historically minded teachers must be
cautious about how Douglass is presented. Between 1876 and 1995,
Douglass's speech was not widely known among lawyers or law
teachers. That piece of history implies that the speech had relatively
little impact on how people thought about the Constitution during
those years. Offering a canon that presents Chief Justice Taney and
Douglass as a yoked pair of opposing constitutional interpreters may
suggest, somewhat misleadingly, that both interpretive traditions
have been present in American law down through the ages. Precisely
because Balkin and Levinson are correct that Douglass's speech has
not been widely taught, the teacher who now offers Douglass as an
alternative to Taney must take care to convey that this material was
not taught to prior generations of law students. Otherwise, students
who try to understand the struggles over race and the Constitution in
1896 or 1964 may misapprehend the conceptual landscape that
presented itself to the people who shaped constitutional meanings at
those times. The history of the canon is itself a key part of constitutional development, and historically oriented scholars must integrate
that history into whatever new pedagogic canon they promote.

11.

Scott v. Sanford,60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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